ºÚÁϲ»´òìÈ

Questions of what constitutes ‘important’ knowledge, whose epistemologies we value, and how we manage competing knowledge claims are central to the design of curricula in plural democracies. In Northern Ireland (NI), the recent , issued in November 2025, illustrates the importance of these considerations, as well as the risks that can arise where curriculum development does not reflect or engage with non-dominant perspectives. The Court judgment ruled that the primary RE curriculum in state-controlled schools, with its exclusively Christian and confessional focus, did not fulfil principles of objectivity, criticality or plurality, and was therefore indoctrinatory. Consequently, it was found to breach parents’ rights to education that conforms with their own religious and philosophical convictions (Article 2(i) of the First Protocol (read with Article 9) of the ).

In our chapter for the (Loader et al., 2024), we consider the epistemic harm that the existing primary RE curriculum perpetuates in a society increasingly characterised by a diversity of faiths and worldviews. We argue that, through its focus on Christian instruction, the current syllabus establishes Christianity as normative in NI and tacitly communicates that other worldviews are . If other religious traditions are acknowledged within the classroom, this is typically in fragmentary or superficial terms that – often contrary to educators’ intentions – can . Applying the lens of epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007), we suggest that these arrangements may perpetuate harm in two ways.

Forms of epistemic injustice

First, by marginalising information about traditions other than Christianity, the curriculum denies pupils access to the interpretive resources that can help them make sense of their encounters with faiths or belief systems of which they are not members. As children lack influence over the curriculum that withholds this knowledge, this may constitute an injustice against them as knowers (McNulty & Henning, 2019). Furthermore, in the absence of critical and objective information, children may be forced to rely on other, less desirable resources to appraise other religious beliefs, including populist discourses and biased news sources. Where this contributes to the development of prejudicial attitudes, the curriculum itself may be implicated – through its omissions – in perpetuating hostility.

‘In the absence of critical and objective information, children may be forced to rely on other, less desirable resources to appraise other religious beliefs, including populist discourses and biased news sources.’

Second, and relatedly, by failing to provide pupils with the language and concepts of religions other than Christianity, the current curriculum may prevent children from non-Christian backgrounds from communicating their social and spiritual experiences in a way that is meaningful to them and their peers. In such cases, the available interpretive resources may only offer these children ‘at best ill-fitting meanings to draw on in the effort to render [their experiences] intelligible’ (Fricker, 2007, p. 148). As Dotson (2011) describes, such experiences can lead to self-silencing (or ‘testimonial smothering’) by a speaker who fears they will not be understood.

Towards a new syllabus for religious education

In response to the Supreme Court ruling, the NI Minister for Education, Paul Givan, has announced a review of the Core Syllabus for RE. Positively, the review’s state that the revised syllabus should be structured in an objective manner and be pluralist and inclusive. Although Christianity is to remain ‘the central focus’, the new syllabus will ensure – knowledge that can help them to navigate a religiously diverse society. Somewhat concerningly, however, there is no specified role for representatives from non-Christian traditions in drafting the syllabus, which risks perpetuating hermeneutical marginalisation.

Beyond religious education and Northern Ireland, this case speaks to the importance of epistemic inclusion in education, ensuring children have access to knowledge that enables them to make sense of others’ experiences and to understand and share their own. From decolonial pedagogies in the classroom to curriculum policies that centre pluralistic knowledge, epistemic inclusion should be embedded within education systems. Educational research can support this through the empirical analysis of distinctly epistemic inequities in education and consideration of strategies for redress.

References

Dotson, K. (2011). Tracking epistemic violence, tracking practices of silencing. Hypatia, 26(2), 236–257.

Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press.

Loader, R., Hughes, J., Jiménez, E., & O’Boyle, A. (2024). The primary curriculum for religious education in Northern Ireland: Making a case for epistemic justice. In M. Moncrieffe,  M. Kustatscher, O. Fakunle, & A. Olsson Rost (Eds.), The ºÚÁϲ»´òìÈ guide to decolonising the curriculum: Equity and inclusion in educational research and practice (pp. 31–39). Emerald Publishing.

McNulty, L., & Henning, L. (2019). Children’s epistemic rights and hermeneutical marginalisation in schools. In T. Feldges (Ed.) Philosophy and the study of education. (pp. 54–64). Taylor & Francis.